There is serious concern that the sale of new cars in the UK will be reduced in the coming year because superstitious people want to avoid the 13 numberplate. Practical people may dismiss this as credulous nonsense but the prejudices of consumers, right or wrong, are still in their own right economic facts with which business has to deal.

In any case, even among the practical – especially among the practical – it is difficult to find anyone with serious business experience who is unworried about the year ahead. The euro looks shakier than ever. Italy’s technocratic but unelected government has retained the confidence of the markets but is in its last days: it will probably be replaced either by a leftist coalition under a former communist or possibly by the return by Silvio Berlusconi – neither a force for stability. In Spain, a new government trying to cope manfully with the consequences of its predecessor’s free spending faces huge unemployment. France’s attempt to develop an alternative to German austerity has been undermined by its reliance on a 75% top tax rate. The flight of that epitome of all things French, Gerard Depardieu, across the border to Belgium is symbolic of a general flight of confidence.

Any one of these three giants going the way of Greece and Ireland would be a greater catastrophe than both the latter put together – and any or all of the three could go next year. It will be a minor miracle if none of them does.

Before that, there is the small matter of America’s “fiscal cliff” to avoid. In a squalid bargain that does credit to no one, Democratic President Barack Obama and Congressional Republicans put off tough decisions on the budget deficit until after the elections. Now the elections are over, and tax cuts passed under the younger President Bush are set to expire. Almost no one in Washington wants that to happen, but President Obama, flushed with victory after his re-election, has initiated a very dangerous game of chicken.

He says he will veto the renewal if it includes the tax cuts on higher earners. Republicans who control the House of Representatives are pledged to apply the tax cuts to everyone. Whether they were wise to make such a pledge is beside the point: the political fact of the matter is that everyone remembers how the elder President Bush never recovered from going back on his equally unviable pledge of “no new taxes.”

Compromise is still possible, but there is very little trust and goodwill between the two sides. In any case, this is no way to run a global economy. Whether it is initiated in America, France, Italy, Spain, or one of a dozen other danger points, a crisis in 2013 is more likely than not, and this one will be down to the politicians, not the bankers and borrowers as it was in 2008. Hold on: it may be a rough ride in the coming year.

The euro crisis has now claimed a centre-left Prime Minister in Greece and a centre-right one in Italy. Leftist Spain is keeping a low profile, trying very hard not to be noticed – almost certainly in vain.

Yet it would be a mistake to write off the Mediterranean economies as “all the same”. Greece is a true basket case, a welfare state in the literal sense – a state dependant on welfare – underwritten mainly by the Germans. Italy, however, is in many ways a strong economy, at least in parts, with lots of viable businesses and an understanding of the need for international marketing. The present crisis is all about past deficits rather than future prospects.

Italy’s underlying problems go back a long way: weak governments since the beginning of the Republic encouraged structural inefficiencies. As a result, public sector debt has grown out of control under governments of both left and right. This could be ignored in the years of growth, but not since 2008.

Silvio Berlusconi attempted some reforms, but half-heartedly and largely without success.  So the markets rose a little on the news of his resignation – only to fall dramatically when realisation set in: If Berlusconi cannot deliver reform, who can?

There is no one in Italian politics with anything like Berlusconi’s power and personal dynamism. Although he has lost the high approval ratings he once enjoyed, the fact that he ever had such large majorities makes him almost unique among the Republic’s Prime Ministers, and he still has a larger block of parliamentarians and voters loyal to him than any other Italian politician. He might object to the comparison, but he was the most powerful Italian leader since Mussolini. He delivered an unparalleled period of relative stability in Italian politics. If he must share some of the blame for some of Italy’s failure to reform, he also deserves at least part of the credit for her recent prosperity.

Largely portrayed in the English speaking media as a buffoon, he is nevertheless a self-made multi-millionaire and understood business – unlike the career politicians and bureaucrats of the European Establishment, who never embraced him. His clowning led many to underestimate him: his road to power was over their political graves. He was a product of the openly corrupt Italy of the 70s, but he did not create the system that made him and which he exploited so skilfully. An unelected technocrat is unlikely to succeed where he failed.

Many Italians say openly that only a Mussolini can sort their country out. The EU seems keen to take on that role. For all his many, many faults, Silvio Berlusconi may yet go down as having been the last, best hope of Italian democracy.

At the very least, the eurozone will weaker without him – and a lot duller.